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Blackburn’s Rejection of Modals
Scott Shalkowski
University of Leeds
Résumé : Dans cet article je présente le dilemme de Simon Blackburn pour
les théories vériconditionnelles de la modalité, et je discute de ses limitations.
Je discute la nature de circularité conceptuelle et argumentative, j’argumente
que la circularité conceptuelle ne s’applique pas à toutes les théories véricon-
ditionnelles de la modalité et que, de plus, la circularité argumentative ne
s’applique pas. Il n’y a rien d’erroné, en principe, avec les théories de la mo-
dalité en termes non modaux, mais les questions épistémologiques présentes
sont significatives et ont été trop peu traitées. Je conclus que le dilemme de
Blackburn est insuffisant pour défricher le terrain pour sa propre conception
quasi-réaliste de la modalité.
Abstract: In this paper I present Simon Blackburn’s dilemma for truth con-
ditional theories of modality and discuss its limitations. I discuss the nature
of conceptual and argumentative circularity and argue that conceptual circu-
larity does not apply to all of the main truth conditional theories of modality
and that, likewise, argumentative circularity does not apply. There is noth-
ing wrong, in principle, with theories of the modal in non-modal terms, but
attending epistemological issues are significant and have been given too little
attention. I conclude that Blackburn’s dilemma is insufficient for clearing the
way for his own quasi-realist account of modality.
Introduction
Simon Blackburn is a quasi-realist about both moral and modal dis-
course. His position is realist because he accepts that we sometimes
speak truly when we say that some things are right and others wrong.
Likewise when we say that some things are possible and others not. It
is “merely” quasi-realism, though, because he parts company with many
realists regarding what it is for a claim regarding morals or modals to be
true. Realists typically want the truth of claims about subject matters
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regarding which they are realists to be a matter of something “objective”,
something “out there”, something not wholly about us and our beliefs,
or our conceptual capabilities or linguistic practices. Blackburn eschews
this portion of typical realist ideology for moral and modal claims. We
can have truth, but there is no “out there” about it. The facts that
make for the truth or falsity of various utterances in moral or modal
discourses are facts about us; they are our own attitudes/commitments
that we project onto the world and this projection gives us an illusion
of a certain kind of fact-based objectivity. Moral and modal truth is not
about moral or modal facts; it is about our attitudes regarding actions,
events, objects, and the like.
Developing a projectivist theory of the modal is all very well. Suppose
that it were done. It would have little force in warranting the acceptance
of the theory. A developed theory is nothing more than a philosophical
Just So story. Might be; might not be. What separates a Just So story
from a theory that has some claim on rational assent is some ground
for thinking the theory true—either reasons in favour of the theory or
reasons against the going alternatives. Blackburn produces an argu-
ment that purports to show that realist theories that are any more than
“quasi-” lead us to think that there are facts of certain kinds when there
are none. It is this argument regarding modals that will be the subject
of the remainder of this paper.
The Argument
Blackburn’s argument works at a very high level of generality. He is not
concerned with some paradox that is peculiar to David Lewis’s specific
realism about modality, which involves the claim that there is a plurality
of concrete worlds that are the truth conditions for true modal claims.
Nor is he concerned with the deficiencies of theories of possible worlds
that are likewise realist and truth conditional in their semantics but with
possible worlds of some different kind. Blackburn’s argument is supposed
to show that there is something fundamentally misguided about any
theory of the modal that is an articulation of the view that the truth
and falsity of various modal claims is a matter of truth conditions. He
claims that some modal claims are true and some modal claims are false,
just not that their truth/falsity consists in some conditions, however
complex and wherever located. Not only is Lewis’s truth conditional
theory rejected, but so are theories that claim that the truth conditions
are conditions of us, whether psychological or linguistic. The entire truth
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conditional programme for the modal is misguided. His argument, then,
is intended as a silver bullet argument against all forms of realism about
modals.
The argument is as follows. Consider a theory of the modal, a theory
that specifies the truth conditions for some claim regarding necessity.
Its form would be a bi-conditional stating that it is necessary that A
if and only if some fact, F , obtains.1 Consider the fact F . Is this
fact modal in character or not? If it is necessary, then the theory is
that it is necessary that A if and only if some necessary fact obtains.
Such a theory is inadequate because “there will be the same bad residual
‘must’ ” [Blackburn 1993, 53]. Suppose, then, that F is not a modal fact.
Then there is a mismatch between the sides of the bi-conditional. On
the one side is the claim that something is necessary; on the other, a
fact with no modal force. Consequently, “there is strong pressure to feel
that the original necessity has not been explained or identified, so much
as undermined” [Blackburn, 1993, 53]. A fact with no modal force is
patently inadequate as the truth condition for a claim involving necessity.
If neither modal facts nor non-modal facts are adequate for a theory of
the modal, then on the modest assumption that all facts are either modal
or non-modal, no truth conditional theory of the modal is adequate.
The Purpose of a Theory
Blackburn is objecting to a certain kind of theory: one that purports to
be both explanatory and truth conditional. Though he puts his concern
in terms of judgements, truth, and truth conditions, he need not. He
could simply frame things in terms of that in which necessity consists,
with ‘A’ and ‘F ’ merely being dummies which, in the hands of different
theorists, might take different things as substituends. If ‘A’ stands for
some truth bearer or other, then the issue might be one of necessary truth
and ‘F ’ might stand for some non-linguistic state of the world. Or, ‘A’
might do duty for states which are themselves taken to be necessary,
such as four being twice two and ‘F ’ might stand for some other states
of numbers or sets or structures. Blackburn does not separate meta-
linguistic from object language issues. Following suit, I note only that
there are subtleties that deserve further attention, but I leave those for
another occasion.
1The appeal to facts is intended to be as uncontroversial as possible. I attribute
to no party any more than appeal to worldly conditions, like the cat’s being on the
mat. Whether these conditions have anything to do with universals, for example, is
something on which I can remain neutral here.
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The fundamental problem that Blackburn thinks he has identified is
the inevitable failure of explanation that will attend any “direct” theory
of modality. A dilemma akin to the Euthryphro dilemma is posed. On
one horn is a problem something like circularity. On the other is the
problem that the theory remains unsatisfying, even if not circular. It
is not question begging to suspect that something is awry, since one
advocating this argument gives the appearance of being impossible to
satisfy. Blackburn takes the argument to show not that no theory of the
modal whatever is adequate but only that no truth-conditional, non-
projectivist, theory is adequate.
In setting his own quasi-realist alternative against all truth condi-
tional approaches, Blackburn needs his argument to work against rather
different understandings of the point of a truth-conditional theory of the
modal.
“Within this conception of the philosopher’s quest, there is
room for disagreement over detail—for instance, whether the
description of the state of affairs finally fixed upon as making
true the original modal judgement has to be synonymous
with that judgement; whether one range of arguments or
another succeeds in showing some concepts to be defective,
or over what would count as an admissible reduction class
for the modal claims.” [Blackburn 1993, 53]
With the remainder of this paper I will argue that closer attention to
these details is necessary for assessing the effectiveness of the dilemma
posed by Blackburn. Since the first horn of the dilemma is a circularity-
like problem, I will begin by examining when circularity is a problem.
First, to what sort of theory is circularity even so much as relevant?
Certainly, any theory that purports to be an illuminating conceptual
analysis is a failure if the analysans uses the very concept to be anal-
ysed. Circularity in analyses, like circularity in arguments, is not a
simple, straightforward matter though. One might say that an argu-
ment is circular if the conclusion appears as a premise in its own proof.
This account of circularity expresses at least a sufficient condition for
a kind of circularity in argument that undermines the effectiveness of
the argument. It is most dubious, though, as a statement of conditions
that are both necessary and sufficient for circularity. One would be hard
pressed to find any argument proposed by a reputable philosopher that
failed because its proponent failed to spot the conclusion hiding, explic-
itly, among the premises. Likewise, analyses rarely, if ever, fail because
the very concept to be analyzed was used in the analysis.
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In an argument, it is much more likely that circularity is present
when one introduces a premise for which one would be hard pressed to
provide adequate grounds without appealing to the conclusion of the
circular argument. In analyses, it is more likely that one concept is anal-
ysed in terms of others and the crucial concepts in the analysandum and
the analysans form a tightly-knit family of concepts and, furthermore,
the legitimacy of the entire family is the matter of philosophical dis-
pute. Given that Blackburn’s task is to provide grounds for a non-truth-
conditional, projectivist understanding of modal discourse and given that
this argument for the general untenability of truth conditional accounts
is to provide some of those grounds, it is this reliance on a tightly-knit
family of concepts that is in question. To say that A is necessary if
and only if it is not possible that not-A is certainly to avoid the first,
simple-minded, kind of circularity and it would be uncharitable to think
that the circularity at issue was one so easily avoided. Since, however,
necessity and possibility are so closely related and given the breadth of
Blackburn’s overall project, it is the status of the entire family of alethic
modal notions that is in question. So, if our theory of the modal is to
be a conceptual analysis and if the issue is whether the entire family of
modal concepts is philosophically respectable, then the standard anal-
ysis of necessity in terms of possibility and negation that one finds in
textbooks is clearly inadequate.
The Purpose of Analysis
“Analytic” philosophers hark back to a time when Anglo-American phi-
losophy took as its raison d’être the analysis of concepts. Though the
explicit rationale for taking philosophy to be conceptual analysis was
the elimination of metaphysics and all intellectual things insufficiently
answerable to experience, the focus on metaphysics, ethics, and reli-
gious belief obscured the primary value that was to be maximized via
conceptual analysis, i.e., some epistemic value that I shall label “war-
rant". That there were metaphysicians who seemed to say unverifiable
or unfalsifiable things was a problem only because the apparent lack of
verifiability/falsifiability for metaphysical claims meant that one impor-
tant means of providing warrant for a non-trivial claim was unavailable.
Furthermore, one important means of gaining agreement to a metaphys-
ical claim by way of rational persuasion was unavailable. Consequently,
metaphysics gave the appearance of being unmoored, of being the project
of constructing systems with no generally-accepted means of adjudicat-
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ing between them.
Conceptual analysis promised to provide a means of securing warrant
for philosophical claims. If philosophical claims are about the interre-
lations among concepts, and if conceptual content is sufficiently trans-
parent, then with the guidance of an expert philosopher we could come
to see that some philosophical claims deserved our assent and others
did not. The project of analysis was gradually replaced, partly because
of critiques of the ideological foundations of conceptual analysis [Quine
1953] and partly, I suspect, because fewer issues were settled than one
might have expected if conceptual content were sufficiently transparent
to us. As a result, metaphysics was revived and other domains took
on the appearance of metaphysics at least to this extent: philosophers
gradually spoke less in terms of the meaning of ‘cause’, ‘natural right’,
or ‘knowledge’; they spoke instead of what causation, natural rights, and
knowledge are. It was no longer what the content of a concept was. Per-
haps our concepts are not well-behaved, or they are poorly structured,
or they are otherwise inadequate for all of our intellectual endeavours.
No matter. We are really interested in what it is for two events or facts
to be causally related, or what it is to have rights by nature, or what it
is to know something. Whether the relevant information has ever been
packed into our concepts is irrelevant, if upon investigation we could
arrive at an acceptable theory of the relevant phenomenon.
The pertinent question for us now is what kind of philosophical theory
is it against which Blackburn presses his dilemma? If the offending
theory is supposed by its proponents to be a conceptual analysis, then
the charge of circularity is relevant. If the theory is not intended as a
conceptual analysis and if it is to be a theory of what it is, in reality,
for something to be necessary, then some further account of a different
defect, perhaps so analogous to the two kinds of circularity canvassed
above that it deserves the same name, must be given.
Conceptual Projects
Suppose the project is to legitimize the use of the family of modal no-
tions that includes the notions of necessity, possibility, contingency, and
impossibility. It is a commonplace now to concede that these notions
form a family of inter-definable notions, so long as we have purely logi-
cal notions like negation to hand. Because of their inter-definability, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain that necessity is the conceptu-
ally fundamental member of the family while the others are defined in
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terms of it. If the task of a theory of the modal is to provide a route
into understanding one concept in terms of others that can be under-
stood prior to the concept analysed, then perhaps the phenomenon of
inter-definability prevents success. One either has mastery of all mem-
bers of that modal family or of none at all. Blackburn, however, is not
concerned with the success of this project. He objects neither that he
or others fail to understand the concepts nor that understanding does
not begin with a single conceptual ancestor for the rest of the family.
He takes for granted that we have the appropriate understanding, how-
ever it is achieved. His concern is the substance behind our sensible
and competent use of the concepts, and for that he provides his quasi-
realist alternative. So, while the dilemma he poses would be sufficient
to prevent success in completing this kind of task, this task is not his
target.
A different metaphorical way of thinking about this particular task
is to think that modal concepts are part of a conceptual structure. That
structure is well-founded, if it has foundations, i.e., if there are fun-
damental concepts in terms of which all others are analysed. If it is
assumed that the modal structure is a superstructure, then the modal
superstructure requires non-modal foundations. On such a picture, the
family of inter-definable concepts is inadequate to supply these founda-
tions, since each member of the family is part of the superstructure.
Continuing the metaphor, why should we think, that the modal
structure is part of the conceptual superstructure? Why not, rather,
think that it is part of the foundations of any sophisticated conceptual
structure? If modal concepts are not definable in terms of non-modal
concepts, that is evidence that when we reach those concepts we have
reached conceptual bedrock. If so, then the inter-definability of modal
concepts is unsurprising. Consider Euclidean geometry. Point, line seg-
ment, line, plane. Pick one and with uncontroversial resources, the others
can be defined. These four concepts form a tightly-knit family of inter-
definable notions. No philosopher of mathematics, however, is exercised
over the legitimacy over Euclidean geometry on the basis of the inter-
definability of these concepts. Instead, all take the family to form part
of the conceptual basis for geometry. It is an interesting question how
one can come to grasp concepts that form a small conceptual circle, but
the geometry case demonstrates that whether we provide a satisfactory
theory of how this is done, the lack of such a theory in no way provides
grounds for thinking that the phenomenon does not occur. It mani-
festly does and all parties find this so obvious in the case of fundamental
geometric concepts that the issue is rarely raised.
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The circularity horn of Blackburn’s dilemma not only may be grasped,
but it is grasped by those who take modality, i.e., at least one modal
concept, to be primitive. Modalists look at this horn and see not only
nothing troubling, but they also see nothing surprising. Graeme Forbes,
for instance, explicitly embraces modal concepts as basic to show that
David Lewis’s possible worlds discourse provides no theoretical advan-
tage when it comes to expressing truths about possibility [Forbes 1985].
This horn of the dilemma, then, is inadequate by itself. Were the horn
supplemented with some further considerations, it might form part of
an overall basis for rejecting modalism in particular and truth condi-
tional theories of modality in general. Perhaps the considerations that
motivated the early Analytic philosophers could be invoked here and
arguments could be given that there is too little agreement on modal
matters to think that we employ modal concepts to good effect for ex-
pressing truths. Perhaps, there is no good modal epistemology that could
form part of an overall modalist framework. Perhaps our use of modal
discourse fails to show the signs of the kind of truth and objectivity
that the typical modalist wants [Wright 1993]. None of these, though, is
Blackburn’s strategy. His dilemma is supposed to be sufficient to see off
of any truth conditional theory of modality, even one that takes modal
notions as enabling us to express basic features of the world. Once we
were to have seen that there is something deeply misguided by the en-
tire truth conditional approach, we were to be open to the quasi-realist
alternative. Since the phenomenon given in the first horn is part of the
modalist’s theory, it cannot be effective against the modalist’s theory.
Were we to go no further, we have grounds for thinking that—so far as
Blackburn has argued—there are at least two going alternatives in the
theory of modality: modalism and quasi-realism.
Non-Conceptual Projects
Given the kinds of theories that Blackburn must have had in mind,
it is clear that those theories were not really intended as conceptual
analyses. David Lewis made clear that his project was not conceptual
analysis [Lewis, 1986]. If it had been he would not have relied as he did on
inference to the best explanation as the main means of providing warrant
for his version of the ontology of a plurality of concrete worlds. Lewis
recommended using inference to the best explanation to justify his theory
partly because it showed philosophical justification to be similar to the
means of justification used by scientists. This parallel with scientific
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justification could not have been maintained plausibly had Lewis thought
his project to be that of the conceptual analyst. Whereas conceptual
analysis is the pursuit of a set of concepts that means precisely what
that to be analysed means, inference to the best explanation is meant as
an evidence-providing exercise that, if successful, raises the probability of
the conclusion which articulates that which is to be the best explanation
for the phenomena reported in the premises of the inference.
If conceptual analysis was not the project for Lewis and others, then
the relevance of Blackburn’s dilemma to the going theories of modality
is not immediately obvious. Perhaps the circularity is not really concep-
tual, but metaphysical. Perhaps it is not that the concept of possibility
can be defined only by way of other modal concepts that are part of
the same conceptual family, but that in order for Lewis’s account to be
correct, it must be the case that all and only the possible worlds exist.
Not just any old set of worlds will do. Blackburn does not make this
particular point explicitly, though something like it has been made in
[Lycan 1979], [McGinn 1981], and [Shalkowski 1994]. I will not pursue
this consideration further both because it is not Blackburn’s and be-
cause it seems to inhabit some middle ground between conceptual and
argumentative circularity.
If conceptual circularity is not at issue for many contemporary truth
conditional theories of the modal, perhaps the arguments given for the
relevant theories are circular. Perhaps, for example, Lewis’s theory that
something is possible if and only if it occurs or exists in some concrete
world can be accepted as extensionally adequate only if one has some
prior justification for accepting that there really is a plurality of all
and only genuinely possible concrete worlds. If there were impossible
concrete worlds or if the plurality were missing some worlds that are
possible, then the analysis would not be extensionally adequate. Ruling
out such states of the plurality, perhaps, could be done only after one
had accepted the general Lewis-style account.
If this is the problem, we can make some progress if we ask what is
supposed to be so bad about argumentative circularity. “It is necessary
that A if and only if necessarily A” is not false, even if wholly useless
as an illuminating analysis. Likewise, inferring that it is necessary that
A from the premise that it is necessary that A will never lead one from
truth to falsity. So, what is the problem supposed to be? The faulty
analysis need not be false and the faulty argument need not lead to a
conclusion that is false.
Argumentative circularity is troublesome because it prevents an ad-
vocate of that argument from persuading one of the conclusion on its
basis. A necessary condition for an argument being persuasive is that
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one believes the premises and understands that the premises provide
good grounds for the conclusion. Acceptance of the conclusion needs
to be on the basis of a prior acceptance of the premises. A circular
argument prevents this priority condition on rational persuasion from
obtaining. Hence, circularity is an argumentative defect and the defect
is epistemic. A circular argument fails to impart entitlement to embrace
the conclusion to one who accepts the conclusion on the basis of that
argument.
Against the modern metaphysician, as contrasted with the conceptual
analyst, Blackburn’s dilemma becomes this: by virtue of not being a
conceptual analysis, the form of the theory does not, by itself, generate
sufficient confidence in the theory. The schematic theory is that it is
necessary that A if and only if F , for some non-modal F . Any defence
of this theory will either make plain that F is sufficient for the necessity
of A by way of circularity, or else the argument will fail to demonstrate
that A really is necessary in virtue of F . For metaphysicans wary of
framing their theory in terms of “in virtue of”, an exactly parallel problem
can be posed regarding the extensional adequacy of the theory: either
the argument that the non-modal F is extensionally adequate for the
necessity of A is circular or else the argument will fail to demonstrate
the adequacy of the non-modal F for the necessity of A.
Lewis, at least, took great care to avoid any charge of circularity in
his use of inference to the best explanation. The strategy was to spec-
ify things for which philosophers want theories, show that if the thesis
about a plurality of worlds were true, we could provide a single, uni-
fied theory of those things. Certainly, there are competing theories for
the truth conditions of modal claims, the semantics for counterfactual
conditionals, the natures of properties and propositions, etc. Each of
those competing theories is, however, a single-issue theory. Lewis’s the-
ory provides a single framework within which one can provide theories
of all of these things. As scientists take theoretical unification as a mark
of scientific truth, so Lewis takes philosophical unification as a mark of
philosophical truth. The inference to the best explanation generates no
more circularity for metaphysical theories than it does for physical the-
ories. So the first horn of our new dilemma can be avoided, if inference
to the best explanation is legitimate in metaphysics.2
Consider now the second horn, according to which there is no residual
“must” but a fugitive “must”. Any theory stating that the truth condi-
tions for a necessary A in terms of some non-modal F inadvertently
2I argue that inference to the best explanation is not legitimate in metaphysics in
Inference to the Best Explanation and Metaphysical Projects [Shalkowski forthcom-
ing].
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renders the A unnecessary. The A is supposed to have modal force, but
the F is not. Thus, any theory of the necessity of four’s being twice two
will, in effect drain four’s being twice two of all modal force.3
The mistake of this inference can be seen by focusing on reductive
theories in science, since Lewis models the justification of his own view
on the justification for these theories. Let us bracket any question of
the modal status of scientific reductions, since scientists may or may not
think that the scientific reductions they propose are necessary. When
asked what lightning is, we are told that lightning is the discharge of
static electricity either between clouds or between clouds and the surface
of the earth. Here we have a theory of lightning in non-lightning terms.
No problem. If there is a problem for theories of modality that are given
in non-modal terms, it is not that they are theories of A-things in terms
of non-A-things, where we categorize A-things and non-A-things on the
basis of the concepts we use to specify them. If it really is the case that
something is possible if and only if it occurs/exists in some concrete
world that is just one among many, why is that any less adequate than
the modern theory of lightning?
The troublesome difference is epistemic. In the scientific case, the
theory identifying lightning with the discharge of static electricity is not
even accepted unless investigators are in a position to identify occur-
rences of lightning and discharges of static electricity independently of
each other. I, being rather incompetent as an experimenter about all
things electrical, am capable of identifying times and locations of light-
ning strikes. Someone else who is well schooled in the fine art of detecting
discharges of static electricity can set up the relevant devices to measure
such discharges. I can keep my log about where and when I see strikes of
lightning during a storm and the intrepid weather scientist can likewise
keep a log of discharges. Later, we can compare notes. We repeat the
procedure at other times and with other investigators. At some stage
we might reasonably conclude that lightning is nothing but discharges
of static electricity because we have never confronted cases where we
were in a position to observe both the phenomenon as lightning and the
phenomenon as a discharge of static electricity and where the time and
location of the lightning was not also a time and location of a discharge
of static electricity. We may be well aware that an inference from this
3This is not to say that the account renders it contingent that four is twice two. If
four is twice two but might not have been, then four’s being twice two is contingent.
The second horn of the dilemma is that for any non-modal F, A has no modal force
at all.
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unbroken correlation among observations is not conclusive grounds for
thinking that these phenomena are identical, but at some point we take
the grounds to be more than sufficient.
The problem with metaphysical theories of modality is not their form;
it is their means of justification. What is missing from typical metaphysi-
cal theories—not just metaphysical theories of modality—is independent
access to phenomena described using different vocabulary. We can ob-
serve that some things are red and some green. What we do not observe
independently is the universals of redness and greenness being instanti-
ated or the presence of the trope of this gown’s redness and that ball’s
greenness. Our access to the universals or the tropes is solely by way of
philosophical theory. This is the same kind of problem that those who
pursued semantic analysis as the proper task of philosophers sought to
avoid and the problem to which metaphysicians need to devote more
attention.
Suppose we were in a position regarding possibilities and the states
of the plurality of worlds as we are regarding lightning and discharges
of static electricity. What could the problem be? It might be somewhat
surprising that possibility really is just existence. We had not expected
that because we had been thinking that there is only one world and,
consequently, we had been thinking that what exists does not exhaust
what is possible. We had also been thinking that the possible was not
co-extensive with the necessary. If we keep the latter but give up the for-
mer, then we lose our resistance to thinking that existence somewhere is
really what possibility comes to and that existence everywhere (suitably
qualified) is what necessity comes to. Blackburn is right regarding the
second horn of his dilemma to this extent: so long as we keep in place all
of our initial, metaphysically-naïve assumptions, a theory of the modal
in non-modal terms will appear inadequate. If, to continue to use Lewis’s
theory as our example, it turns out that every warranted judgement we
make about possibility is correlated with existence in some world, then
we should not take our initial surprise as a philosophical trump card any
more than believers in Zeus’s hurling lightning bolts at the earth when
angry should take their initial surprise that Zeus might have nothing to
do with lightning as a trump card against scientific accounts of lightning.
Initial intellectual surprises can be overcome with sufficient grounds. The
problem, then, is mis-diagnosed by Blackburn in the second horn of his
dilemma. There is nothing wrong, in principle, with giving a theory of
A-things in terms of non-A-things, assuming that it is not intended as a
conceptual analysis. If there is a problem with a theory of the modal in
terms of the non-modal, it is not the initial “pressure” we feel to think
that the theory fails. It is a matter of wider epistemic issues that the
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dilemma does not touch.
Conclusion
Blackburn’s generalisation of the Euthyphro dilemma is inadequate to
the task to which he wanted to put it. It is insufficient as grounds for
casting aside all forms of truth conditional accounts of the modal. If all
such accounts of the modal required both that the theory be a conceptual
analysis and that the analysis permit one to break into the circle of modal
concepts and attain mastery of modal concepts, then the dilemma would
effectively show all truth conditional theories to fail. On might take the
project to be that of providing a conceptual analysis, but not one that
is sufficient to gain competence with all modal vocabulary. Any such
semantic account would assume some modal competence and would serve
only to characterise relations among different modal concepts and could
not legitimize the entire domain of our modal conceptual framework. A
conceptual analysis of the modal in non-modal terms does fail for the
reason Blackburn suggests: the analysis does not wear its adequacy on
its sleeve the way conceptual analyses should.
Most truth conditional theories of the modal, however, are not in-
tended as conceptual analyses of either sort. There are modalist accounts
according to which some modal concepts are fundamental, i.e., for which
there are no non-modal equivalents. Unless one holds the thesis that ev-
ery concept is subject to an analysis in terms more basic concepts, there
must be some basic concepts at which conceptual analysis stops.4 Why
not some modal concept or other? The dilemma does nothing to answer
this question. There are other, more metaphysical, theories that may
not even address the issue of the meaning of modal concepts, but only
the truth conditions of modal claims. Since they do not even pretend to
express the meaning of modal concepts, then the fact that understand-
ing an account of the modal in terms of the non-modal does not bring
warrant for believing the account is itself insufficient to show that ac-
count really to be inadequate. Such a theory must, surely, fit with some
suitable account not only of how one can come to have warranted belief
about particular modal claims—like the claim that four is twice two—
but also how one could come to have warranted belief in that particular
4If there are analyses “all the way down”, then one must confront the question of
how it is that one can begin the process of concept acquisition, if the process continues
infinitely, or the question of why large conceptual circles are philosophically adequate,
but small ones are not.
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truth conditional theory of modality. These epistemic issues are impor-
tant and too-little addressed in the philosophy of modality. That these
deserve more attention than they have received does nothing, however, to
undermine the contention of this paper: that Blackburn’s dilemma fails
to show something wrong with all truth conditional theories of modality.
It fails to show that we have a philosophical itch that should be dealt
with in some way other than by finding a truth conditional theory that
reaches the itch so that it can be scratched.
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